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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
ROGER AUDERSON and· 
THOMAS E. BRACKENBURY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
16372 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants were charged with the crime of tampering 
with a witness, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants were tried and convicted before a jury 
of the crime of tampering with a witness on January 31, 1979, 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Wasatch 
County, Utah, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, presiding. 
Appellant Anderson was sentenced to serve a term not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison and fined $500. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant Brackenbury was sentenced to serve nine months in 
the Wasatch County Jail and fined $500. Both appellants 
were placed on twenty-four month probation in lieu of 
serving the proscribed sentence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict 
of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early evening of May 28, 1978, the 
appellants [Anderson and Brackenbury] entered the J & M 
Saloon, owned and operated by one James E. Garner, and 
located in the town of Soldier Summit, Utah. At that 
time, Anderson was Chief of Police of Soldier Summit and 
Brackenbury was the Justice of the Peace for Soldier 
Summit. 
When appellants entered the Saloon, James 
Garner and a male patron of the saloon were playing a 
guitar and discussing the subject of Karate (Tr. p. 40). 
Subsequently, another patron, one Ray Applegate, and Garner 
took off their shoes and were demonstrating Karate moves 
to each other (Tr. p. 40). Anderson, according to 
Garner's testimony at trial, then walked between Garner 
and Appelgate "as though there were trouble" (Tr. p. 41). 
-2-
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Appellants then moved to the rear of the bar and 
seated themselves on two stools. 
As appellants state in their brief (page 2) , 
the nature and content of the conversation between 
appellants and Garner was a matter in controversy 
at trial. Garner testified that Anderson "got kind of 
huffy about the Karate incident" and that he (Anderson) 
said, "I'd better explain I'm a black belt" (Tr. p. 41,42). 
After the karate incident, appellants called 
Garner over to join them. Their purposes in visiting 
the saloon and in calling Garner over to talk were in 
dispute at trial. According to the testimony of Garner, 
Anderson called him "down to the end of the bar and said 
he had some business he wanted to discuss" (Tr. p. 41). 
Anderson testified at trial that he had "information 
there was alcohol being sold" (Tr. p. 152) and went to 
the saloon to see what he could find out. 
At some point during the conversation between 
appellants and Garner, Applegate approached the men and 
asked if he could be of assistance. Applegate testified 
at trial that he "figured there was going to be a fight." 
Anderson told Applegate that he was chief of police (Tr. 
p. 58) and Applegate returned to his seat. The testimony 
at trial reveals inconsistent recollections of the content 
of the conversation between Applegate, Garner and 
-3-
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appellants. Appellants contend that Garner told them 
"he's [Applegate] my bouncer" and Applegate testified at 
trial that "Mr. Garner told him [Anderson] that I was 
his bouncer .•. But I thought he was just teasing .•. I 
didn't say I was anybody's bouncer" (Tr. p. 86). 
Garner testified that at some point in this 
~iscussion, Anderson started using "bad language" in 
front of his wife and Garner reached across the table 
and "kind of slapped him." The record does not support 
appellant's contention that Anderson was "drinking a soft 
drink" (Appellant's Brief, p. 3) at the time Garner 
slapped him. According to the testimony of Anderson at 
trial, Brackenbury "had a bottle with him" when the two 
entered the saloon. Anderson and Brackenbury subsequently 
left the premises and Anderson returned with a uniformed 
policeman, one Erwin J. Curtis. Curtis testified at 
trial that Anderson appeared "excited, definitely 
excited" when Anderson approached him and asked him to 
go over to the bar with him. Curtis and Anderson entered 
the J & M.Saloon and proceeded to arrest Garner for 
assaulting an officer. Anderson grabbed Garner and a 
scuffle ensued. Curtis handcuffed Garner, took him outside 
and placed him in the patrol car. Curtis.then transported 
Garner to the Utah County Jail (Tr. p. 102). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Appellants state in their brief that Anderson 
returned to the J & M Saloon after Garner's arrest to 
"gather information and to arrest Ray Applegate for 
interferring with an officer" (Appellant's Brief, p. 4). 1 
Applegate testified at trial that he had consumed 
"three drinks and a beer" (Tr. p. 83). When questioned 
on cross-examination by appellants' counsel as to whether 
he had had "quite a bit to drink," Applegate responded, "No, 
sir," (Tr. p. 86). Garner also testified at trial that he 
(Appelgate) "wasn't intoxicated for what he had to drink" 
(Tr. p. 48). When Anderson returned to the saloon and 
asked Applegate to "go with him," Applegate left with 
Anderson and they proceeded across the street to a trailer. 
According to Applegate's testimony at trial, Anderson 
"shoved" him "a couple of times" as they crossed the 
street and then "kind of shoved me [Applegate] in there" 
[the housetrailer] where he told Applegate he was under 
arrest for interferring with police officers on duty (Tr. p. 
63) • 
The events which occurred in the trailer were in 
dispute at trial. Applegate testified that Anderson 
asked him if he saw Garner hit him and that he responded 
1 It should be noted that such conduct has not had 
criminal sanctions for more than three years. 
See State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975). 
-s-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that he "didn't see anybody hit anybody. I was 
at the other end of the bar" (Tr. 64). Appellant further 
testified that Anderson "grabbed me by my shirt" and said, 
"Yes, you did. Tom saw him strike me." Applegate testified 
that An.::.ersor +:hen "picked me up by my shirt, raised me up 
out of the chair" and tore his shirt (Tr. 64). Anderson 
said, "let me show you judo" or something to that effect and 
pushed Applegate backwards over his outstretched leg (Tr. 64). 
Applegate "hit the floor" on his back. Anderson called 
Applegate a "cottonpicking dink" and said to Applegate, "I 
could kill you with my bare hands, you fat --and--" (Tr. 65). 
Applegate testified that Brackenbury told Anderson to 
"simmer down" and get in uniform. Anderson returned in 
uniform about twenty minutes later, during which time one 
George R. Schade, the Mayor of Soldier Summit, had arrived 
at the trailer (Tr. 65). 
Whether Applegate had purchased liquor on the premis 
of the J & M Saloon and had seen Garner hit Anderson in the 
mouth was disputed at trial. Certain statements to that 
effect had been prepared by Brackenbury for Applegate's 
signature. Whether Applegate signed the statements voluntarL 
was also in dispute at trial, with Appellants contending 
that Applegate signed the statements of "his own free will" 
(Tr. 160). Applegate, however, testified at trial that he wi 
-6-
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told to sign the statements and signed because, in his own 
words, "I was scared, they had already pushed me around, and 
I was scared maybe they might push me around again or beat me 
up or something," (Tr. p. 73-74). 
After Applegate signed the statements in the 
presence of appellants and the Mayor, he went over to the 
cafe to have breakfast and was later joined by Anderson who 
told Applegate he "wouldn't recommend [him) corning back 
through that area again" (Tr. 76). Applegate then returned 
to his truck and left the town of Soldier Summit. 
Curtis, the police officer who had arrested 
Garner and transported him to the Utah County Jail, returned 
to Soldier Summit at approximately 1:00 a.rn. He testified 
that he had a conversation with Anderson and Brackenbury in 
the cafe wherein Anderson stated "I've got him now." I've 
got a statement here of him selling whiskey over the bar." 
When Curtis asked Anderson if Applegate voluntarily gave 
a statement, Anderson responded that he "had to rough him up 
a little bit, but [he) got the statement." (Tr. 104). 
Curtis further testified that Brackenbury said "He [Anderson) 
roughed him up pr·etty good" (Tr. 104) . Curtis also testified 
as to a conversation he had with Anderson several weeks after 
the saloon incident where Curtis asked Anderson what he was 
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"going to do if they find Applegate." Anderson stated to 
Curtis that "He had beat him and he was so scared .. 
that the bastard or son of a bitch is still running." 
(Tr. p. 104). 
A subsequent investigation was made and appellants 
were charge6 · . .:.. th the crime of witness tampering of which the: 
were subs~~uently convicted of at trial. 
A preliminary hearing was held on November 28, 197!, 
in the Circuit Court of Wasatch County, the Honorable E. Patri1 
McGuire, presiding. One of the State's witnesses, Ray 
Applegate, did not reside in the State and was not present at 
the preliminary hearing. The State introduced the affidavit 
of Mr. Applegate and move<l the court to admit the affidavit 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann., § 77-15-19 
(Supp. 1973). The court admitted the affidavit but 
imposed the condition that the State arrange to have Applegat 
available one day prior to trial to afford the defendants 
the opportunity to confront him (P.H. Tr. p. 17). Subsequer: 
th~ defendants were bound over for trial. 
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l\RGTJMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS WERE AFFORDED THEIR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY 
HEARING. 
Appellants assert that there is an absolute right 
of confrontation and cross-examination at preliminary hearings 
in Utah and that this right was violated in their case when 
the committing magistrate allowed the State to invoke the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-19 (1953), as amended, 
and introduce a sworn affidavit to establish probable cause, 
rather than call the affiant, who resided out of state, as 
a witness at the preliminary hearing. They claim that 
because of the court's above ruling, they were "in effect" 
denied their right to a preliminary hearing. 
Respondent will show that there is no 
constitutional right to confrontation and cross-examination 
at preliminary hearings under either the United States or 
Utah Constitutions, and at most, there is only a limited 
statutory right which has been recently restricted by 
the Utah legislature with the recent enactment of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-15-19, supra, which permits the use of 
hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings. 
Appellants concede at the outset of their 
argument that there is no federal constitutional right 
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to a preliminary hearing (Appellant's Brief, p. 6). See 
United States ex rel. Kassin v. Mulligen, 295 U.S. 396, 
55 S.Ct. 781, 79 L.Ed. 1501 (1935). Nevertheless, 
appellants cite Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 s.ct. 
854, 431 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), as suggestive of a federal 
ri~ht to a preliminary hearing. However, the Court in 
Gerstein was concerned with the issue of whether a person 
arrested and held for trial under a prosecutor's inforrna-
tion is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determina-
tion of probable cause for pretrial restraint of liberty. 
In holding that an informal non-adversary proceeding 
would suffice, the Court discussed the procedures 
allowed by state statutes to determine probable cause 
at a preliminary hearing such as presentation of witnesses, 
cross-examination and so forth. The Court stated: 
These adversary safeguards are not 
essential for the probable cause 
determination. 
* * * 
This is not to say that confronta-
tion and cross-examination might not enhance 
the reliability of probable cause determina-
tions in some cases. In most cases, however, 
their value would be too slight to justify 
holding, as a matter of constitutional 
principal, that these formalities and safe-
guards designed for trial must also be 
employed in making the Fourth Amendment 
determination of probable cause. 
Id. at 121-122 (emphasis added). 
-10-
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As the Court stated in Gerstein, the constitutional 
provisions which guarantee certain rights to the accused 
in a criminal trial are not necessarily applicable to 
preliminary proceedings. See also United States v. Neff, 
525 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1975). Thus, it is clear there 
is no federal constitutional right to a preliminary 
hearing, nor to confrontation and cross-examination at 
hearings where probable cause determinations are made. 
Appellants then accurately state that there 
is a provision for a preliminary hearing in the Utah 
Constitution at Art. I § 13. However, this provision 
is totally silent as to the extent of procedural due 
process available at a preliminary hearing. Art. I § 13 
provides as follows: 
Offenses heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by indictment, shall be 
prosecuted by information after examina-
tion and commitment by a magistrate, 
unless the examination be waived by the 
accused with the consent of the State, 
or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The forma-
tion of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by 
the Legislature. 
Despite this silence in the Utah Constitution, 
appellants attempt to create the impression that there is 
a state constitutional right to confrontation and cross-
examination at preliminary hearings. They rely on another 
-11-
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constitutional provision (Art. I § 12) and case law 
construing that provision. However, both the provision 
and the case law only apply to rights at trial and have 
absolutely no application at a preliminary hearing. 
Art. I § 12 provides as follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify 
in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In 
no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not 
be compelled to testify against her husband, 
nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Appellants confuse the constitutional guarantees afforded 
the accused at trial with the procedure of the preliminary 
hearing. In each case cited by appellants in support of 
their argument that as defendants they had the right to 
cross-examine and confront all witnesses against them at 
the preliminary hearing, the situation involved a trial 
setting, not a preliminary hearing, where the right to 
·cross-examination is well-settled. State v. Mannion, 
-12-
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57 Pac. 542 (Utah 1899); State v. King, 68 Pac. 418 
(Utah 1902); and State v. Kendrick, 538 P.2d 313 (Utah 
1975). The right to confront one's accusers at trial 
is a right guaranteed by both the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution. In several 
Utah cases, where the situation was reversed, i.e., 
rather than introducing written affidavits at the 
preliminary hearing and having the witness present 
at trial, the witness gave testimony at the preliminary 
hearing but was not present at trial to testify, this 
Court has determined that the right to confront witnesses 
was not violated by allowing the testimony of the witnesses, 
taken at the preliminary hearing, who were shown to be 
absent from the State, to be read into evidence. See 
State v. Vance, 110 Pac. 434 (Utah 1910); State v. Inlow, 
141 Pac. 530 (Utah 1914); and State v. Depretto, 155 Pac. 
336 (Utah 1916). Although the preferable practice would 
be to have the witness available for cross-examination 
at the trial, in the presence of the ultimate fact-finder 
so that demeanor could be observed, this Court has 
concluded that the absence of a witness at trial, where 
testimony from the preliminary hearing is available, is 
not a violation of the accused's right to confrontation. 
-13-
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In Barker v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
The right to confrontation is 
basically a trial right. It includes 
both the opportunity to cross examine 
and the occasion for the jury to weigh 
the demeanor of the witness. A prP-
liminary hearing is ordinarily a much 
less searching exploration into the 
merits of a case than a trial, simply 
b~cause its function is the more limited 
on~ of determining whether probable 
cause exists to hold the accused for 
trial. 
Id. at 725 (emphasis added). 
One year later in Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 
314, 89 s.ct. 540, 21 L.Ed.2d 508 (1969) I the Court held 
to its rationale in Barker and observed that one of the 
important objectives of the right to confrontation at 
trial was to guarantee that the ultimate fact finder who 
determines guilt or innocence had an adequate opportunity 
to assess the credibility of witnesses. 
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is only 
to determine whether there is probable cause that a crime 
was committed and that the accused committed that 
crime to justify holding the accused to stand trial. The 
preliminary hearing is not designed to be a mini-trial but 
rather it is to be used as a screening device to insure 
the existence of probable cause before making the accused 
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stand trial. Miller v. Dist. Ct. in and for Nineteenth 
Judicial District, 566 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1977). Nor is 
it designed to afford discovery for the accused as suggested 
by appellants. Robbins v. United States, 476 F.2d 26 
(10th Cir. 1973). While a preliminary hearing must 
comply with certain requirements of due process, this 
does not mean that all procedures used in a trial must 
be employed. State v. Lenehan, 471 P.2d 748 (Ariz. 1970). 
Moreover, the function of a preliminary hearing 
is like that of a grand jury proceeding (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1 et seq., and Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-1 et seq.) 
in that both procedures seek to determine the existence 
of probable cause to require a person to stand trial. 
Yet, it will be noted that an accused at a grand jury 
proceeding has no right to even be present (unless called 
as a witness), Johnson v. Superior Court of San Joaquin 
County, 539 P.2d 792 (Calif. 1975), and no right to cross-
examine or confront witnesses against him. See State v. 
Salazar, 469 P.2d 157 (N.M. 1970). While Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-19-3 provides that a witness testifying before a 
grand jury has the right to counsel and the right not to 
incriminate himself, the statute does not provide for 
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses by the 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accused. Thus, because both procedures seek only to 
determine the existence of probable cause sufficient 
to indict or bind over for trial, the rights guaranteed 
a defendant in "criminal prosecutions," i.e., a. trial, 
have no application. Grand jury proceedings, like 
preliminary hearings, are not criminal prosecutions. 
Rather, they are inquests into whether there should be 
a criminal prosecution against the accused. Thus, the 
constitutional rights of cross-examination and confronta-
tion afforded a defendant at a criminal prosecution are 
not applicable to grand jury proceedings or pre-
liminary hearings except to the extent the legislature may 
grant those rights by statute. 
Respondent recognizes that a defendant does have 
a limited statutory right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses called to testify at the preliminary hearing 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-55-10, which provides that 
"witnesses must be examined in the presence of the 
defendant and may be cross-examined in his behalf. 
However, the statute does not necessarily require that 
all witnesses must testify at the preliminary hearing, 
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but rather that those witnesses called to testify 
must do so in the presence of the defendant, i.e., 
witnesses cannot be examined by the judge in camera with the 
accused excluded. Moreover, the statutory right extended 
by Section 77-15-10, supra, is far from absolute and clearly 
may be limited by the legislature without constitutional 
violation. 
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In fact, this statutory right was recently narrowed and 
modified by the enactment of Utah Code Ann., § 77-15-19 
(Supp. 1977), which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(2) The rule of evidence for 
trial of criminal cases shall apply 
at the preliminary examination, 
exceot that hearsay evidence that 
would not be admissible at trial 
shall be admitted if the Court 
determines that it would impose an 
~~reasonable burden on one of the 
E~r~ies or on a witness to require 
tha~ the primary source of the evidence 
be produced at the hearing, and if the 
witness or party furnishes information 
bearing on the informant's reliability, 
and, as far as possible, the means by 
which the information was obtained. 
When hearsay evidence is admitted, the 
court, in determining the existence of 
sufficient cause, shall consider: 
(a) The extent to which the 
hearsay quality of the evidence affects 
the weight it should be given, and 
(b) The likelihood of evidence 
other than hearsay being available at 
trial to provide the information 
furnished by hearsay at the pre-
liminary hearing. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the legislature may giveth and the legislat~ 
may taketh away the extent of confrontation and cross-
examination available to an accused at a preliminary 
hearing. Moreover, respondent submits that these statutes 
are not in conflict as appellants contend. They may be 
read together as giving a limited right to confrontation and 
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cross-examination at a preliminary hearing and should be 
read together and harmonized. 
The law is well settled that statutes should be 
read as a whole so that all provisions can be given meaning and 
made compatible if possible. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
County, 568 P.2d 738 (Utah, 1977); Great Salt Lake Authority 
v. Island Ranching Co., 414 P.2d 963, 18 Utah 2d 45, rehearing 
421 P.2d 504, 18 Utah 2d 276 (Utah, 1966); and Andrus v. 
Allred, 404 P.2d 972, 17 Utah 2d 106 (Utah, 1965). Reading 
the two provisions at issue here, it would appear that while 
the accused has the right, pursuant to 77-15-10, to cross-
examine all witnesses called to testify at the preliminary 
hearing, the statute does not require all witnesses to be 
called, as in this case where the witness resides out-of-
state, and in such situations where, in the language of the 
statute, "the court determines that it would impose an 
unreasonable burden on one of the parties or on a witness to 
require that the primary source of the evidence be produced at 
the hearing," then 77-15-19 will allow the use of hearsay 
evidence, such as affidavits, to be admissible upon the 
magistrate's determination of sufficient cause. 
Appellants argue that a sworn affidavit is not hearsay 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 12), but cite no authority to support 
this position. Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines 
hearsay as follows: 
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Evidence of a statement which is 
made other than by a witness while 
testifying at the hearing offered to 
prove the truth of the matter stated 
is hearsay evidence 
Rule 63 then proceeds to list certain items which, though 
re~oanized to be hearsay, may nevertheless be admissible 
under certain ~it~ations. Affidavits are listed as the 
second exception to the hearsay rule, and are rendered 
admissible to the extent allowed by statutes and rules of 
procedure of this state. Therefore, respondent submits that 
the Affidavit of Ray Applegate certainly qualifies as 
"Evidence of a statement" made out of court "offered to prove 
the truth of the matter stated" and therefore is hearsay. 
However, under the statute, this type of hearsay i.e., an 
affidavit, is admissible as an exception to the general rule. 
Further, the case law supports respondent's contention that 
an affidavit based on one's own knowledge and belief, 
submitted for evidentiary purposes, is hearsay. See Frankl~ 
v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 204 P.2d 37 (Calif. 1949). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Sections 77-15-1'. 
and 17 are viewed as inconsistent, general rules of statutor: 
construction would validate § 77-15-19 as being controlling. 
Whether one asserts the later-in-time rule, i.e., that the 
last statute embodies the latest intent of the legislature 
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and is therefore controlling (see State ex rel. Bird v. 
Apodaca, 573 P.2d 213 (N.M. 1977), or the rule that the more 
specific statute controls over the more general statute 
(See Matter of Hutchinson's Estate, 577 P.2d 1074 (Alaska, 
1978), and Rarnmell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah, 1977), or 
the doctrine of repeal by implication where the earlier statute 
is treated as being completely repealed bythe later statute 
(See State v. Mcintire, 537 P.2d 1151, 22 Or. App. 161, 
adhered to 540 P.2d 399, 22 Or. App. 611 (Or. App. 1975), the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann., § 77-15-19 would still prevail. 
In support of their claim of a right to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses at a preliminary hearing, 
appellants are forced to argue that Utah Code Ann., § 77-15-19 
is unconstitutional on its face or at least as applied in their 
case. First, respondent has already shown that there is no 
constitutional right to confront or cross-examine witnesses 
at a preliminary hearing under either the federal or state 
constitutions, and thus appellants' claim that § 77-15-19 
is unconstitutional on its face is without merit. Secondly, 
as applied to the facts of this case, the magistrate properly 
admitted the hearsay affidavit of Ray Applegate under the 
statute. Perhaps the most important factor in the magistrate's 
decision was that the witness, Ray Applegate, did not reside 
within the State but was a resident of Oklahoma, and the 
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inconvenience of bringing him within the jurisdiction of Uta 
for the preliminary hearing, combined with the expense, 
appeared unnecessary in light of the affidavit and its ad-
missibility under 77-15-19. Secondly, the reliability of thi 
hearsay evidence, in this case, a sworn statement, which if 
incorrect or untrue, is prosecutable as a crime under Utah 
Code Ann., ~ .-8-502 and § 76-8-506, coupled with the fact 
that Applegate would be available to testify at trial, 
further supports the magistrate's decision to admit the 
hearsay evidence. 
Appellants complain that the State's introduction 
of the Affidavit was done to "circumvent the defendants' 
rights under Utah Code Ann., § 77-15-10" and as a result, 
"a valuable source of pre-trial discovery was foreclosed" 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 12, 13). 
Respondent asserts that there is no right to 
criminal discovery. In a recent Utah case, State v. Niels~ 
522 P.2d 1366 (Utah, 1974), this Court held that the rules 
of civil procedure pertaining to discovery are inapplicabU 
in criminal cases, stating: 
The majority rule is to the effect 
that neither statutes nor rules of 
civil procedure providing for discovery 
or the inspection of evidence in the 
possession of an adverse party will be 
made applicable to criminal cases. 
Citations omitted, Id. at 1367. 
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Finally, appellants imply that the State 
sought to have the evidence introduced to "circumvent" their 
rights under § 77-15-10. Respondent would like to point 
out that the magistrate accepted the State's motion to admit 
the hearsay evidence pursuant to 77-15-19 with the under-
standing that if the motion were denied and the hearsay evidence 
not admitted, the preliminary hearing would be post-poned 
to a later date and the witness made available (Prelim. H. 
Transcript, p. 17). Further, upon granting the State's 
motion, the Court expressed concern over the fact that 
Applegate was not there and the following conversation took 
place: 
--
MR CALL: I have no objection to 
him talking to the witness. I do have 
some objection to us having him here 
two or three days early because someone 
is going to have to pay this man's 
expenses. 
THE COURT: Let's say the day before. 
Probably you would want him in the day 
before. If the trial is set on a Tuesday 
in the District Court, I don't think it 
would be--surely it would be agreeable 
that he could be here. 
MR. CALL: Trials of this matter in 
District Court are set any day in the 
week wherever there's a vacancy so it 
could be any time during the week. 
THE COURT: Let's assume that the 
procedure was compatible, I see no 
reason why you should have a complaint 
to Mr. Lewis examining the witness 
the day before trial. I'm not talking 
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about evidence for preliminary, 
we're talking about his right to 
take a look at the witness, okay? 
MR. CALL: I have no objection. 
Thus, the Court exercised its discretion in 
admitting the hearsay evidence to establish probable cause, 
and in an effort to minimize any possible harm which might 
occur to appella~ts due to the absence of Applegate, made 
arrangements with the prosecutor on the record to have 
Applegate available one day prior to trial. 
In summary, respondent submits there is no 
constitutional right to confrontation and cross-examination 
at a preliminary hearing under either the Utah or the United 
States Constitutions. Moreover, there is, at most, a very 
narrow and limited statutory right provided by Section 
77-15-10 what has been severely restricted and modified by 
the recent enactment of Section 77-15-19(2), which was 
properly invoked and followed in the instant case. Thus, 
appellants were not effectively denied their right to a 
preliminary hearing. 
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POINT II. 
UTAH CODE ANN., § 76-8-508 (1953), 
AS AMENDED, IS NEITHER CONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE NOR OVERBROAD. 
Appellants claim that Utah's witness tampering 
statute under which they were convicted is unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad. 
The well-established standard for vagueness 
requires that a criminal statute be declared void only when 
it is so vague that "men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application." Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 
U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926). 
See also, State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah, 1952). 
The test for overbreadth was recently stated by 
this Court in Salt Lake City, v. Peipenburg, 571 P.2d 1299 
(Utah, 1977). In Peipenburg, a criminal case involving 
the restriction of First Amendment freedoms, a challenge was 
made to the ordinance on vagueness and overbreadth grounds. 
In upholding the ordinance, Justice Crockett noted, in a 
concurring opinion, that the proper standard in such cases 
was that the statute must be "sufficiently clear and specific 
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that persons of ordinary intelligence, who desire to know whu 
the law is, and to abide by it, would have no difficulty in 
understanding what is prohibited." (Id. at 1300-1301). 
The statute under which appellants were convicted, 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-508 (1953), as amended, reads as 
fc '.lows: 
A person is guilty of a felony 
of the third degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending 
or about to be instituted, he attempts 
to induce or otherwise cause a person 
to: 
(a) Testify or inform falsely . . . 
Appellants commence their claim that the statute 
is impermissibly vague by merely stating that certain terms 
are undefined in the statute, to wit: "induce," "otherwise 
cause," "testify," and "inform." Appellants, however, fail 
to state why they feel the above terms are vague and develop 
no argument on this point other than their conclusory 
statement that the terms are vague because they are un-
defined. It is a well-established principle of statutory 
construction that common words carry a common meaning, 
(See Caminetti v. United States,242U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct.l 
194, 61 L.Ed. 442, 453 (1917). The above terms have common 
-26-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
usage in the English language and are found in Webster's 
Dictionary and respondent submits they clearly provide 
meaning to "men of common intelligence" so that they need 
not guess at the meaning and application of the terms. 
See State v. Packard, supra. 
The main thrust of appellants' argument for 
vagueness and overbreadth, however, is their claim that the 
witness tampering statute contains no mens rea element 
requiring the actor to "knowingly, intentionally, willfully 
or recklessly" attempt to induce or otherwise cause a person 
to testify or inform falsely. Thus, they claim that without 
the inclusion of one of the above terms before the word 
"attempt" in the statute, persons of common intelligence 
are forced to guess at its meaning and the statute conceivably 
could apply to situations of lawful as well as unlawful 
conduct, thereby rendering the law overbroad. 
Appellants concede at the outset of their mens 
rea argument that the statute does contain an intent element 
of "believing," but they argue that the term only describes 
the state of mind of knowing an official proceeding is 
pending or about to be instituted, and does not focus on 
the terms "attempts to induce or otherwise cause" which, 
they assert, are the major criminal elements of the witness 
tampering offense. 
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Respondent submits that the crime of witness 
tampering does contain an element of mens rea, both 
implicitly and explicitly, and that the word "believing" 
is highly relevant to show an implicit mens rea in the 
statute. Before a person may be convicted of witness tamperir 
he must believe that an official proceeding or investigation 
is pending. Then, with that knowledge or belief, he must 
make an attempt to induce or otherwise cause someone to 
testify or inform falsely. The terms "attempt," "induce", as 
well as "believe" are all defined in Webster's Dictionary, ~ 
each definition contains a notion that a person who does any 
of these things, does so with knowledge or intent. For 
example, the word "attempt" is defined as: "to make an 
effort to do .. or effect;"·to"induce" is "to move by 
persuasion or influence." Thus, when a person attempts to 
induce another to lie, "believing" that an official proceedinc 
or investigation is pending, it follows that these elements 
work together to create an overall picture of a person who 
acts consciously, knowingly, purposefully, and with criminal 
intent, to induce or cause a person to testify or inform 
falsely. In short, respondent submits that it may be 
presumed that when one attempts to induce or otherwise 
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cause something to happen, having a prior belief of a certain 
set of facts, that it is implicit, as a matter of common 
sense, that tney knowingly and intentionally do so. 
This common sense approach is applicable to many 
criminal offenses. For example, the statute defining the 
crime of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44 (Supp., 1979), does not expressly 
contain an intent element, yet it is implicit within the 
statute. Section 41-6-44(a) reads as follows: 
It is unlawful and punishable as 
provided in subsection (d) of this section 
for any person who is under the influence 
of alcohol . . . to a degree which 
renders the person incapable of safely driving 
a vehicle to drive or be in actual physical 
control of any vehicle within this state .•. 
The predecessor to this statute was challenged 
for vagueness because of a lack of an express mens rea 
provision, to wit, failure of the law to state that the 
intoxicated person "intentionally" or "knowingly" drive. Yet 
this Court found the criminal intent implicit within the law. 
See Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (1974). 
The mere fact that the statute itself does not 
contain the magic words "knowingly" or intelligently" is 
not fatal. Indeed, as appellants condede at page 16 of their 
Brief, a state may even make certain acts criminal which 
are unaccompanied by a mens rea. See Powell v. State, 392 
U.S. 514 (1968), and State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 
P.2d 1075 (Utah, 1959). 
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Thus, so long as the acts described are not 
imperrnissibly vague or overbroad due to lack of an 
express mens rea provision, the statute should be upheld 
where the mens rea element is implicit. 
In any event, respondent submits that even if 
a mens rea element is not considered to be implicit within 
Section 76-8-508, Utah has explicitly provided a general 
mens area provision in the Criminal Code which the Legislatun 
has intended to be read in conjunction with statutes not 
expressly containing a mens rea. Utah Code Ann., §§ 76-2-101 
and 102 provide as follows: 
101: No person is guilty of an 
offense unless his conduct is pro-
hibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly or with criminal 
negligence with respect to each element 
of the offense as the definition of the 
offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense 
involving strict liability. 
102: Every offense not involving 
strict liability shall require a culpable 
mental state, and when the definition of 
the offense does not specify a culpable 
mental state, intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish 
criminal responsibility. (Emphasis added). 
Section 102 contemplates the situation where the 
statute does not specify the mens rea necessary to commit a 
crime and provides that where the statute does not specify a 
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culpable mental state, "intent, knowledge or recklessness" 
will suffice to establish the criminal responsibility. Thus, 
although the Legislature required that each offense not 
specifically designated a strict liability offense have 
a culpable mental state element, the Legislature did not go 
so far as to require that each statute defining a non-strict 
liability criminal offense expressly contain a mens rea 
requirement. Instead, § 76-2-102 was enacted as a general 
mens rea provision to be used in conjunction with, applied 
to, and read together with those non-strict liability 
statutes lacking an express intent provision . Thus, 
§ 76-2-102 applies much like Utah's attempt statute, Utah 
Code Ann., § 76-4-101 (Supp. 1973), which is read together 
with other criminal statutes to provide all of the elements 
of a particular attempt crime. For example, the crime of 
attempted burglary is found by reading Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-4-101 together with § 76-6-202 (Supp., 1973). Moreover, 
even if Section 76-8-508 were perceived as not containing a 
mens rea provision at all, such is totally permissible as 
conceded by appellants at page 16 of their Brief. See 
Powell v. Texas, supra. 
Thus, appellants were put on legal notice as to 
the requisite mens rea for the crime of witness tampering. 
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Moreover, it has been well established that: 
[S]tatutes should not be declared 
unconstitutional if there is any reasonable 
basis upon which they may be sustained as 
falling within the constitutional frame-
work . . . (cites omitted) . . . and that 
a statute will not be held void for un-
certainty if any sort of sensible, 
practical effect may be given it. 
State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952). 
2ee Buhler v. Stone, 533 P.2d 292, 293-294 (Utah, 1975), 
and Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-807 (Utah, 1974). 
In Wagner v. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 2d 42, 504 
P.2d 1007, 1012 (1972), this Court noted that: 
It is a well-established rule of 
constitutional law that where there 
are two alternatives as to the in-
terpretation of a statute, one of which 
would make its constitutionality 
doubtful and the other would render it 
constitutional, the latter will prevail. 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann., § 68-3-2 (1953), as 
amended, directs that all laws and statutes of the state 
should be liberally construed "with a view to effect the 
objects of the statutes and to promote justice." 
Assuming, arguendo, that Section 76-2-101 and 102 
do not expressly provide a mens rea for the crime of witness 
tampering, and assuming further that a mens rea is not deernec 
to be implicit within Section 76-8-508 under a common sense 
theory, the only remaining concern is whether an alleged 
lack of a mens rea provision makes the statute impermissiblY 
vague or overbroad. Respondent submits that it does not. 
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Appellants claim that without the mens rea 
provision, the statute (1) requires men of common intelligence 
to guess at its meaning and (2) feasibly covers lawful as 
well as unlawful acts. By way of example, appellants argue 
that all police interrogations involve a certain degree of 
compulsion and intimidation, and unless the witness tampering 
law requires that an officer "knowingly" attempt 
to induce or otherwise cause a person to testify 
or inform falsely, he could be guilty of the crime 
of witness tampering. The lack of logic in appellants' 
argument is obvious. Simply stated, the mere presence of 
authority, i.e., of a uniformed police officer, does not 
encourage or induce people to lie. 
Further, the statute is presumed not to be 
intended to produce results such as appellants claim are 
likely, and where possible, the statute will be given a 
reasonable and sensible construction. See Curtis v. Harmon 
Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah, 1978). 
The statute clearly distinguishes between 
legitimate police investigations and illegitimate ones. 
Moreover, under the facts of this case, the 
statute was correctly applied. Appellants, in their 
official capacity as Chief of Police and Justice of the 
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Peace were engaged in an oppressive interrogation of Ray 
Applegate over an incident which was not even a crime, i.e., 
appellants, by threatening to charge Applegate with the 
non-existent crime of "interferring with a police officer," 
sought to induce or force Applegate to make a false 
statement. 
ResF~ndent further submits that appellants lack 
the requisite standing to raise issues of vagueness and 
overbreadth. That is, an application of the statute to 
the facts of this case was so clearly appropriate that 
appellants should not be permitted to pose hypothetical 
situations which have no application to their own case. 
See Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d at 807-808. 
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 600 (1973), 
the United States Supreme Court considered a challenge to 
the Oklahoma Hatch Act. Appellants in that case claimed 
that portions of the act were impermissibly vague and 
uncertain. The Court in discussing the vagueness claim 
noted that the appellants were charged with "patent" 
violations of the act and stated: 
In the context of this type of 
obviously covered conduct, the 
statement of Mr. Justice Holmes is 
particularly appropriate: if there 
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is any difficulty ... it will be 
time enough to consider it when raised 
by someone whom it concerns. 
(Cite omitted). (Emphasis added) 413 u. S. at 609. 
The Court continued: 
[Elven if the outermost boundaries 
of § 818 may be imprecise, any such 
uncertainty has little relevance here; 
where appellants' conduct falls squarely 
within the hard core of the statute's 
proscriptions . . . 
(Cites omitted). Id. at 608 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 
(1974), a First Amendment case, the Court noted that: "one 
to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully 
challenge it for vagueness." (Emphasis added). This Court 
has adopted the same rule as noted in Greaves, ~, and 
in State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 396 (Utah, 1975), wherein 
this Court stated: 
Also important to be considered • 
is the principle that no one should be 
entitled to challenge a statute and 
have it declared void because it may 
unjustly affect someone else, but could 
properly do so only if his own rights 
are adversely affected. 
(Emphasis added). Id. at 940. 
Even if it is assumed in this case that the 
wording of Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-508, supra, might be 
construed in some hypothetical instances to include 
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interrogations made by police officers which might perceivabi 
be outside the intended scope of the statute or that it might 
oe unclear in some instances whether or not a certain act 
might be included, appellants' behavior clearly falls within 
the intended, explicit scope of the statute. That is, 
appellants, believing an official investigation or pro-
ceeding was pending, (as Chief of Police and Justice of the 
Peace they knew better than anyone else that an investigation 
was pending) , attempted to induce or otherwise cause Ray 
Applegate to testify or inform falsely, to wit: appellants 
used threats and physical force to get Applegate to sign 
the false statements. It follows that appellants have no 
standing on this appeal to challenge the statute on the 
basis that it may have uncertain application to others. If 
uncertainty exists, it did not affect the rights of 
appellants since their conduct was clearly within the conduct 
the statute sought to prohibit. 
Finally, it should be noted that appellants state 
in their Brief, at page 18, that other states have added 
to express mens rea elements to the witness tampering 
statute to bolster this argument that the Utah statute is 
vague and uncertain because it lacks a mens rea element. 
Respondent suggests that Utah has added the mens rea element 
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as well via the companion statute of Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-2-102, and thus appellants' claim is without merit. 
Thus, it is apparent from the rules of statutory 
construction and the above-cited case law that appellants' 
claim that the statute in question, Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-508 
supra, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad is without 
support. Moreover, respondent submits that appellants' 
actions clearly fall within the conduct sought to be pro-
hibited by the statute and the statute, both on its face 
and as applied to appellants, is clearly constitutional 
and that appellants lack requisite standing to challenge 
the statute on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. 
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POINT III 
JURY INSTRUCTION NOS. 6 AND 
7 GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT WERE 
PROPER, AND THE COURT APPROPRIATELY 
REJECTED APPELLANTS' PROPOSED 
INSTRUCTION NOS. 2 THROUGH 6. 
Appellants argue that the trial court's 
jury instruction Nos. 6 and 7 were inadequate and 
erroneous, and that the court committed error by not 
giving appellants' proposed jury instruction Nos. 
2 through 6. 
Instruction No. 6, given by the trial court, 
reads as follows: 
Section 76-8-508 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended, provides in 
part as follows: 
"Tampering with witness ... A 
person is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending 
or about to be instituted, he attempts 
to induce or otherwise cause a person to: 
(a) Testify or inform falsely .... 
(R. p. 90). 
Appellants concede that the court gave a 
verbatim statement of the witness tampering statute, 
Section 76-8-508, supra, in Instruction No. 6 (appellants' 
brief at p. 18). However, they renew the claims raised 
in Point II of their brief, that the statute was 
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irnpermissibly vague and overbroad because it had 
undefined terms and allegedly lacked an express 
mens rea element. Therefore, they argue that Jury 
Instruction No. 6 was likewise vague. Respondent, 
therefore, refers this Court to Point II of this 
brief which thoroughly deals with appellants' claims 
of vagueness and overbreadth, and respondent reasserts 
that the language of the statute is adequately clear, 
and thus the trial judge correctly used the verbatim 
wording of the statute in Instruction No. 6. He could 
have used his own words stating the offense, but 
when words involved are of common usage or understanding, 
which is the case here, further definition is unnecessary. 
See caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917): and 
State v. Jones, 512 P.2d 1262 (N.M. App. 1973). Moreover, 
undefined terms within a statute are to be given their 
common usage and meaning (Point II, supra). Thus, further 
definition in the instructions would have been superfluous 
and perhaps misleading. Appellants in their brief at 
pp. 18-19 again state mere conclusions as to the need 
for further definition but advance no logical reasons 
therefor. 
Appellants also renew the claim raised in Point 
II of their brief that the statute lacked a specific 
mens rea provision, and thus Instruction No. 6 failed 
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to cure this defect. It should be noted, that appellants' 
objections at trial to the jury instructions (see T. 
217-219) did not focus on the lack of mens rea as they 
now claim on appeal. Rather, appellants objected 
that Instruction No. 6 11 , . [w]as not followed up 
with specific instructions defining the terms that are 
used in the statute." (T. 217). Thus, appellants 
failed to preserve this issue for appeal. In any event, 
respondent again submits there was no need for additional 
elucidation of the elements of the statute (Point II, supra). 
and furthermore, the claimed lack of mens rea was cured 
by the trial court's Instruction No. B (R. 92) which 
expressly required the commission of an intentional act. 
Appellants next argue that the trial court 
erred in giving its Instruction No. 7, claiming that 
it presents an inaccurate statement of the law in that 
the statute requires a person to induce or otherwise 
cause a person to "testify or inform falsely," yet 
the court used the term "make a false statement." 
Instruction No. 7 reads as follows: 
To constitute the crime of tampering 
with a witness as it applies to the 
circumstances of this case, it must be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt: 
-40-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. That the defendants believed an 
official proceeding or investigation was 
either pending or about to be instituted 
pertaining to suspected illegal sale of 
liquor by Mr. James Garner, doing business 
as J & M Saloon, and 
2. That they induced or otherwise 
caused Ray Applegate to make a false statement. 
R. 91 (emphasis added). 
Appellants would have this Court read Instruction 
No. 7 in a vacuum, isolated from all other instructions. 
However, the law is well-settled that instructions should 
be considered in their entirety, as a whole. Black v. 
McKnight, 562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977). Moreover, the trial 
court expressly instructed the jury that all instructions 
"are to be considered and construed as one connected 
whole," and "each instruction should be read and understood 
in reference to . . the entire charge and not as though 
any one sentence or instruction separately were intended 
to state the whole law of the case ..•. " Instruction 
No. 16 {emphasis added). 
Thus, when Instruction No. 7 is read together 
with Instruction No. 6, which quoted the witness tampering 
statute verbatim and required the jury to find that 
appellants attempted to induce or otherwise cause 
[Applegate] to "testify or inform falsely," then the 
essential elements of the crime are made clear to the 
jury. 
-41.-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
However, appellants now allege that "testify" 
and ":'1form" in the court's instruction No. 6 did not 
clarify No. 7 because those terms were not defined. 
Yet, the definitions of those two terms which they now 
espouse on appeal, are not the definitions which they 
requested the trial judge to give in their proposed 
jury instructions and are strained, narrow usages 
designe~ to confine and limit the jury in their findings 
far more restrictively than common usage or the statute 
would dictate. 
Appellants' proposed Instruction No. 2 reads 
as follows: "Testify as used in the statute means to 
give evidence according to law." (R. 79). Yet on 
appeal, appellants assert that the word "testify" 
requires statements made "under oath or affirmation" 
and cite legal sources as to the legal definition of 
the word. Although appellants' proposed instruction 
makes no mention of the required "oath or affirmation" 
which they now stress on appeal, appellants claim their 
rejected instruction "substantially embodied" this 
concept (Appellants' brief at p. 20), and imply that 
their definition is far superior to a juror's 
common understanding of the term. 
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Respondent submits that appellants' 
"unrequested instruction," now improperly argued on 
appeal, only embodies one of the common usages or 
definitions of the word "testify." 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1979 
Edition, defines "testify" as follows: 
Testify: (la) To make a statement 
based on personal knowledge or belief: 
(lb) bear witness: to serve as evidence 
or proof; (2) to express a personal 
conviction: (3) to make a solemn declara-
tion under oath for the purpose of 
establishing a fact (as in a court) ••. 
The explanatory notes to Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary at page 17a, contain the following 
explanation for reading the sense division of a 
specific word: 
Boldface Arabic numerals separate 
the senses of a word that have more than 
one sense: 
[e.g.) quiz .•. 1. to make fun of: 
mock 2: to look at inquisitively 3: to 
question closely. 
Thus, the word "testify," according to 
Webster's, has three meanings, only one of which is 
to "make a solemn declaration under oath." Therefore, 
appellants' proposed Instruction No. 2 was unduly 
legalistic and overly restrictive. 
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Appellants' proposed Instruction No. 3, also 
rejected by the trial court, reads as follows: 
Inform as used in the statute 
means to make an accusation against 
another whom he suspects of the 
violation of some penal statute. 
(R. p. 80). On appeal, appellants again claim for the first 
time, that to "inform" also requires an "oath or affirmation." 
Yet, their own proposed Instruction No. 3 clearly did not 
embody thh concept. Nevertheless, appellants claim at p. 22 
of their brief that their proposed instruction "suggested" 
that an oath or affirmation be made. The above proposed 
instruction speaks for itself, and respondent submits that 
the requirement of an oath or affirmation was not even hinted 
in the instruction, and thus the issue was not properly 
preserved for appeal. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the issue is properly 
before this Court, appellants claim that under the doctrine 
of ejusdem generis, the word "inform" must be given a more 
specific interpretation in view of the preceding allegedly big! 
specific term "testify." Thus, they assert that to 
"inform" also requires an "oath or affirmation," which again 
neither their own proposed instruction required nor does 
common usage. 
According to Webster's Dictionary, supra, 
".inform" means "to give information or knowledge," not to 
give evidence under oath or affirmation. Respondent submits 
that Webster's definition of inform would conform to the 
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to the common usage in every-day parlance. 
Furthermore, ejusdem generis, is applicable only 
in situations where a statute lists several specific items 
followed by a general catch-all phrase, usually introduced 
by the words "or other." The general phrase may then be 
construed to be limited to things "of the same kind" 
(ejusdem generis) as the specific items. In this case, the 
statute simply states "testify or inform;" "inform" is not 
preceded by a list of words similar in kind to "testify" 
and in no way could be considered limited by the word "testify." 
Returning to Instruction No. 7 as given by the 
trial court, respondent submits that if any party has cause 
to complain of the court's use of the term "make a false 
statement" rather than "testify or inform falsely," it would 
be the state in that any alleged inaccuracy certainly exists 
in appellants' favor. The Court's instruction narrowed 
the more inclusive words of "testify" or "inform 
falsely" found in the statute to the very specific 
element of "to make a false statement" as stated in 
the instruction; thus, making the possibility of 
conviction more restricted. 
-45-
j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Finally, with respect to Jury Instruction No. 7, 
respondent submits that appellants make much ado about nothing 
due to the fact that under the witness tampering statute, 
the ultimate outcome of the attempted inducement is really 
irrelevant; the actor does not have to cause the victim to 
testify or inform falsely (or make a false statement) 
but merely "attempt" to induce or otherwise cause him to do 
so. Whether the victim ultimately testifies falsely or 
informs falsely is irrelevant to the commission of the crime. 
The word "attempt" along with other words in the 
statute, is one of common meaning and usage and thus, the 
statutory wording as stated in the instruction, although 
narrowed to a more specific act, making a "false statement," 
is sufficient to accurately inform the jury as to the 
elements of the crime. Further, giving of appellants' 
proposed Instructions No. 2 and 3 would have been error and 
may have confused the jurors as to the requisite elements 
of the crime. 
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follows: 
Appellants' proposed Instruction No. 4 reads as 
If you find that the statements 
signed by Ray Applegate were voluntarily 
signed by him, you must find the de-
fendants not guilty. 
Appellants argue that due to the court's failure to give 
this instruction, their theory of the case was not presented 
to the jury. The law is well-settled that the defendant 
should be allowed to present his case to the jury. See 
State v. Ohio, 457 P.2d 618, 23 Utah 2d 70 (Utah, 1969), 
and State v. Ollison, 519 P.2d 393 (Or. App., 1974). However, 
the case law also recognizes that before the defendant is 
entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the 
case, there must be a certain quantum of evidence to 
support that theory. 
Here, appellants have injected a new, additional 
and totally unworkable element into the crime of witness 
tampering. Nowhere within the witness tampering statute, 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-508, supra, is there the requirement 
that the victim involuntarily testify or inform falsely. 
Mere attempted inducement (whether by a money bribe, false 
promises, etc), is sufficient under the statute to 
constitute the offense. Thus, appellants' Instruction No. 4 
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was not only contrary to the law, but is grossly misleading 
and socially reprehensible. Under appellants' theory and 
their proposed Instruction No. 4, a corrupt individual 
could induce a person with money, favors, or other inducement 
to falsely accuse an innocent person of a crime, and even 
testify against that innocent persor,, and as long as the 
inducement was sufficient enough so that the witness 
volun-~-~~Y accepted the deal, the person inducing the one 
actually causing the illegal conduct, could not be prosecuted 
under the statute in question. The respondent submits that 
such a strained interpretation of the statute violates not 
only the intent of the legislature, but also common sense. 
Thus, appellants' proposed Instruction No. 4 was~ 
inaccurate statement of the law and was properly rejected 
by the trial ccurt. 
Appellants' proposed Instruction No. 5 states:' 
Should you find the statements 
signed by Applegate were not voluntarily 
signed, you must nevertheless find the 
defendants not guilty if you also 
find any of the following to be true: 
1. That the statements signed 
were factually correct. 
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The statute in question only requires that the actor 
attempt to induce someone to testify or inform falsely, 
and appellants' proposed Instruction No. 5 goes far beyond 
the intent of the statute and is a misstatement of the 
law. If a person attempts to induce another to inform 
falsely, that person may be convicted even though the other 
person does not yield to the inducement and does not give a 
false statement. Appellants' Instruction would require an 
actual giving of a false statement, and would totally ignore 
the words "attempts to induce" in the statute. 
Also, the proposed Instruction was not factually 
supported. Appellants threatened the victim with arrest for 
a non-existent crime and roughed him up to induce him to state 
that he personally had seen liquor being sold at a specific 
bar earlier that evening, which he had not seen. There was 
never a change in the victim's story; he never saw liquor 
being sold and there was no evidence presented at trial that 
he had. 
Appellant's Proposed Instruction No. 6 states: 
When you are considering the 
credibilities and ability to remember 
of a witness you may take into consideration, 
among other things, the state of intoxication 
of the witness and the extent to which it has 
affected his ability to remember events and 
occurrences. 
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Respondent submits that Instruction No. 11, 
given by the trial court, more than adequately notifies 
the jury of all of the factors to consider in assessing 
the credibility of witnesses without inappropriately 
emphasizing one factor over the other. (See State v. 
Smith, 543 P.2d 834 (N.M. 1975) .) Instruction No. 11 
reads as follows: 
You are the sole judges of the 
weight of the evidence, the credibility 
of the witnesses and the facts. In 
considering the testimony of a witness 
you may consider his appearance and demeanor, 
his apparent frankness and candor, or the 
want of it; his opportunity to observe, his 
ability to understand and his capacity to 
remember; you may consider the interest, if 
any is shown, which any witness may have in 
the result of the trial; and also any bias 
he may have, or any motive or probable 
motive which any witness may have to testify 
for or against either party. 
If you believe any witness has 
wilfully testified falsely, as to any 
material fact in the case, you are at 
liberty to disregard the whole of the 
testimony of such witness, except as he 
may have been corroborated by other credible 
witnesses or credible evidence. You are not 
bound to believe all that the witnesses may 
have testified to nor are you bound to believe 
any witness; you may believe one witness 
against many, or many as against one. In 
the light of the above observations it is your 
privilege to judge the weight to be given 
the testimony of the witnesses and to determine 
what the facts are. 
The jury heard the evidence as to Applegate's state of 
intoxication at the time of the incident involved. As 
·exclusive judges of the credibility of witnesses, they 
were solely within their province to weigh the evidence 
-so-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and the credibility of each witness. See State v. 
~, 89 Pac. 460 (Utah 1907); State v. Green, 
911 Pac. 987 (Utah 1908). Further, the jury may 
accept or reject all or any part of the witness' 
testimony. People v. Gardner, 530 P.2d 496 (Colo. 
1975). 
In this case, the jury received complete, 
adequate and accepted instructions regarding all 
criteria to be used in judging the credibility of 
witnesses ininstruction No. 11. The Court properly 
rejected the superfluous proposed instruction which 
would have improperly emphasized one criterium over 
all others. 
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POINT IV 
THE STATE'S EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO ESTABLISH APPELLANTS' GUILT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Appellants argue that they cannot be guilty 
of violating Section 76-8-508, supra, as a matter of law 
because the state failed to prove certain elements of 
the offense. However, respondent submits that each of 
the "alleged" elements appellant claims were not proved 
are not, in fact, elements of the witness tampering 
statute. Appellants' claim is really three-fold, to-wit: 
1. The state failed to show that appellant's 
written statement was "evidence given according to law 
under oath or affinnation;" 
2. The state failed to show that Applegate's 
written statement was subsequently used in an official 
proceeding or investigation; and 
3. The state failed to show that Applegate 
actually falsely informed to someone other than appellants. 
With respect to appellants' first claim, much 
depends on how this Court resolves the issues raised in 
Point III of this appeal. Appellants asserted in Point 
III that the terms "testify" and "inform" in Section 
76-8-508 must be given a very restrictive legal meaning 
to include only situations where the declarant makes the 
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statement "under oath or affirmation." Respondent has 
shown in Point III that this is an unduly restrictive 
interpretation of the meaning of the terms "testify" 
and "inform." Moreover, appellants' own jury instructions 
attempting to define those terms, did not go that far. 
Rather, appellants have asserted this new requirement or 
element for the first time on appeal, and accordingly it 
should be rejected. Respondent submits that when the 
terms "testify" and "inform" are given their conunon usage 
and meaning, it is clear that the prosecution established 
the elements of the offense of witness tampering by 
showing that appellants attempted to, and in fact, 
induced or otherwise caused Applegate to inform 
falsely--by giving a false written statement--during the 
course of Appellant~' own police investigation which 
they obviously knew was pending or about to be instituted. 
Appellants' next claim is that the state was 
required to prove that Applegate's written statement was, 
in fact, subsequently used in an official proceeding or 
investigation. Respondent submits that even if this were 
an element of the offense, which it is not, that element 
was proved by the state in that Appellants, by their own 
admission at page 26 of their Brief, concede that they 
were engaged in a pending police investigation when the 
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false statement was procurred. Thus, Applegate's 
statement was, in fact, part of a pending official 
"proceeding or investigation." 
More significantly, however, is the fact 
that actual, eventual use of the induced false 
stateme;:,t in an official proceeding or investigation 
is not a requirement of the witness tampering statute. 
Section 76-8-508 merely provides that: 
Believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending 
or about to be instituted, he [the 
actor) attempts to induce or otherwise 
cause a person to: 
(a) Testify or inform falsely. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Actual use of the criminally procured statement in the 
proceeding or investigation is not required. 
Appellant's construction of the statute 
would clearly defeat the purposes for which the 
statute was enacted~.e., to protect witnesses from 
being harassed or threatened by officials or others 
in an attempt to induce the witness to make a false 
statement or to inform falsely. If one were to accept 
appellants' premise, that they were innocent because the 
State failed to establish that the written statement 
signed by Applegate was actually used in an official 
-54-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
proceeding, then surely the statute would lead to 
ridiculous results inconsistent with the purpose and 
intent of the statute. For example, under appellants' 
interpretation, a policeman could literally beat a 
potential witness or bribe him with money, and unless 
the extracted statement were actually used in a 
subsequent official proceeding, the policeman would 
not have to answer for his actions under Section 
76-8-508. 
The statute is designed to punish even those 
persons who merely attempt to induce or otherwise cause 
a person to testify or inform falsely--whether this 
attempt is successful or in vain is irrelevant--the crime 
has been committed once the attempt has been made, not when 
the false statement is given or when and if the person's 
statement is used in an official proceeding. (Of course, 
in the instant case, appellants were shown to have not 
only attempted the inducement but to have completed the 
act.) 
It is well-settled in the law that the words 
of a statute must be given their common meaning unless 
it appears from the context that a different meaning 
should control. See State v. Arnett, 579 P.2d 547, 119 
Ariz. 38 (Ariz. 1978); Crist v. Bishop, 520 P. 2d 196 
(Utah 1974), and Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 485 P.2d 
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1035, 26 Utah 2d 100 (Utah 1971). Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-508 clearly states that a person is guilty 
if "he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person 
to testifv or inform falsely." Giving those words 
their ordinary meaning or common usage, appellants' 
actions, upon a reading of the trial transcript and the 
evidence admitted, clearly fall within the conduct subject 
to criminal sanctions. 
A recent Utah case, State v. Danker, No. 16200, 
rendered August 22, 1979, dealt with the same statute. 
In Danker, the defendant had been convicted under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-508 of witness tampering for dissuading 
her seven year old daughter from testifying in court 
against a male who had been charged with committing 
forcible sodomy upon the daughter. The Court noted 
that under Section 76-8-508, "the state has the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt: that the defendant 
knew an official investigation was in progress; that she 
knew her daughter would be a witness in any subsequent 
proceedings; and that she told her daughter not to 
testify." 
In this case, applying this same requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, appellants by their own 
admission.had heard rumors that alcohol was being sold 
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at the J and M Saloon and they were inyestigating the claim. 
In their positions as Chief of Police and Justice of the 
Peace, surely their efforts would constitute an 
"investigation" within the intent of the statute. The 
fact that they were conducting the investigation leads 
to the conclusion they knew that an investigation 
was "pending or about to be instituted." That appellants 
knew Applegate could be a witness in subsequent 
proceedings is obvious: It was Applegate's statement 
that would give appellants the necessary information to 
proceed. As to whether appellants "attempted to induce 
or otherwise cause" Applegate to testify or inform falsely, 
that evidence is a matter of record in the trial transcript 
and also the version of the facts believed by the jury in 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants were 
guilty. 
Appellants' final claim is that the state failed 
to show that Applegate was requested to inform or in fact 
informed falsely to someone other than appellants. Once 
again, appellants have attempted to add a new element 
to the offense which simply is not there. There 
is no requirement that the victim of the crime eventually 
inform "another" falsely. The mere act of making the false 
statement which might eventually be used later is sufficient 
even if the statement is never actually used. Just because 
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the state discovered the attempted inducement to procure a 
false statement early before it was corrununicated to another 
and actually became part of an official proceeding should 
not bar prosecution for witness tampering. Further, 
appellants' own proposed jury instructions did not even 
suggest a requirement that the false statement be 
corrununicated to someone other than defendants. 
hccordin~~y, this claim should be summarily rejected. 
In conclusion, respondent submits that the 
state proved every element which is actually contained 
within Utah's witness tampering statute beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and appellants' attempt to add 
elements which are not part of the statute, and then 
claim that the state failed to prove these new elements 
should be rejected. 
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POINT V 
IMMUNITY GRANTED TO APPELLANT 
BRACKENBURY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-45-21 DOES NOT PRECLUDE HIS 
PROSECUTION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-45-21 (1953), as amended, 
empowers prosecutors to grant immunity to witnesses who 
may be called upon by the State to support the 
investigation or prosecution of a case. The relevant 
portion of that statute reads: 
In any investigation or prosecution 
of a criminal case, the attorney general 
and any district attorney or county attorney 
shall have the power to grant immunity from 
prosecution to any person who is called or 
who is intended to be called as a witness 
in behalf of the State of Utah whenever the 
attorney general, district attorney or 
county attorney deems that the testimony of 
such person is necessary to the investigation 
and prosecution of such a case. No 
prosecution shall be instituted against 
the person for any crime disclosed by 
his testimony which is privileged under 
this action, provided that should the 
person testify falsely, nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to prevent 
prosecution for perjury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-45-21 (1953), as amended (emphasis added). 
Appellants correctly state in their brief that 
while two types of immunity traditionally exist-transactional 
(which precludes prosecution for any transaction revealed 
by his testimony), and use and derivative use (which only 
precludes the use of privileged testimony in a subsequent 
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prosecution, but does not preclude future prosecution), 
the Utah statute leaves in question which type of 
immunity exists in this state. 
The most authoritative statement by this 
Court on the subject of immunity is in State v. Ward, 
571 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1977) (hereinafter~). Ward 
involved the improper grant of immunity by county 
attorney deputies. The Court held that, in "fairness 
to the defendant and the interests of justice ... the 
prosecution should not be entitled to rely on nor to 
make use of" the testimony given by defendant Ward. 
Id. at 1347. 
In Ward, the majority opinion made several 
significant rulings regarding Section 77-45-21, 
specifically, and the status of immunity in Utah 
generally. As to the statute itself, the Court held: 
Due to the considerations just 
discussed as to the seriousness of the 
responsibility imposed, and the fact that 
it departs from the ideals of equal 
justice, it is our opinion that the 
power to grant immunity is of such 
character that it should not be extended 
by implication or otherwise beyond the 
express terms of the statute. 
Id. at 1346. 
Thus, immunity must always be dealt with in the 
most narrow and strict sense and must not be casually 
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given nor received. It must not be considered to expand 
into areas of a witness' testimony unless expressly given 
by the statute or the officer granting the immunity. 
The court then further stated, with regard to 
immunity in general, that: 
The grant of immunity is supposed 
to be for a quid pro quo in the form of 
information from the grantee, who is or 
may be involved in crime. That is, it 
is in essence a contract. It is 
fundamental that when any agreement is 
entered into it should reflect a meeting 
of the minds of the parties who enter 
into it; and this in turn includes 
knowledge of the foundational facts 
out of which the agreement arises and 
comes into being. 
Id. at 1346. 
Using the Court's analogy of immunity as a 
contract in the present case, it is clear that the 
parties involved had no meeting of the minds with 
regards to the narrow privilege of immunity offered 
to appellant Brackenbury. The transcript of the 
Brackenbury deposition reveals the following dialogue 
between Harold Call, the Wasatch County Attorney and 
Jerry Ungritch,appellant Brackenbury's attorney: 
MR. CALL: Well, the County Attorney's 
office will grant Mr. Brackenbury immunity 
as to the testimony regarding the incident 
in the bar and involving James Garner 
and as to nothing else. 
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MR. UNGRITCH: Is that going to be the 
limit of the scope of examination at this 
time? 
MR. CALL: Well, to the extent that 
we're able to go beyond that in some 
detail, but we have other areas we'd 
like to go into, but we will grant immunity 
only to the incident relating to the bar 
and to James Garner and to his activities 
as Justice of the Peace in relation to the 
arrests and the people brought before him. 
Brackenbury Deposition at 4. 
Assuming that the immunity statute authorizes 
qrants of transactional immunity, the prosecution of 
appellant Brackenbury does not violate the immunity 
actually granted. The County Attorney expressly stated 
that immunity was granted as to the "indicent in the bar 
••• and as to nothing else." Supra. Later in a paragrapt: 
stating that the prosecution would like to be able to 
go into other things, it could be argued that immunity was 
apparently expanded "to his [appellant's] activities 
as Justice of the Peace in relation to the arrests and the 
people brought before him." Appellants argue that this 
"expansion" covered the incident in question. Appellants' 
Brief at 29. However, the "expansion," if it is 
one, could only have pertained to persons arrested and 
brought before appellant Brackenbury as Justice of the 
Peace as illustrated by the questioning which followed 
the immunity. Appellant Brackenbury was questioned about 
the bar incident, among other things, then the county at tor: 
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delved into the serious concerns covered by the additional 
immunity. For example, he questioned appellant extensively 
about whether persons arrested for speeding violations and brought 
before him as Justice of the Peace, had alleged that they 
were not speeding at all. Brackenbury deposition at 26; 
he questioned about arrested persons complaining that 
they were improperly arrested outside city limits, 
Brackenbury deposition at 26-27, 29; he discussed place 
of arrest and the boundaries of the city, Brackenbury 
deposition at 26-30, etc. 
The incident for which appellant was prosecuted 
did not concern an "arrest" of anyone; no one was "brought 
before him" as Justice of the Peace, nor was he acting 
in what anyone could consider as "activities as Justice of 
the Peace." The victim, Applegate, was never under arrest. 
Appellant admits that himself. Brackenbury deposition at 
15 and 21. The victim, Applegate, was never "brought before 
him" for arraignment or for any other purpose relating 
to appellant's duties as Justice of the Peace. During 
the intimidation of the victim, Applegate, appellant 
was certainly not functioning in "activities as Justice 
of the Peace." Appellant himself even admits that: 
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Q. How do you function as a 
Judge impartial when you write the 
statements of the witnesses? 
A. Well, I just wrote what he was 
telling me about it. 
Q. As a Judge, you shouldn't even 
be involved in this until it comes to 
trial, should you? 
A. Right. I understand that. 
Q. Why were you writing witnesses's 
statements on a case that was going to come 
before your court? 
A. Well, Roger asked me to write it, 
and I just wrote down what the statements 
was coming up to. 
Q. Would you agree now you shouldn't 
have done it? 
A. Right. 
Brackenbury Deposition at 23. 
Thus, the additional language in the grant of 
immunity could in no way apply to the incident at hand, but 
to complaints by "arrested" traffic violators or others who 
were "brought before" appellant in his "activities as Justice 
of the Peace." 
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In addition, if the County Attorney's statement 
was misunderstood by appellant Brackenbury's attorney, 
the contractual grant of immunity was never properly formed 
in the first place since there was no clear meeting of the 
minds. (Ward, supra). This disagreement and misunderstanding 
is apparent from the present two briefs. No "contract" of 
immunity was ever entered into (Ward, supra), and thus 
appellant Brackenbury cannot claim any such privilege. 
In addition, respondent urges that a careful 
reading of the quoted dialogue reveals that the County 
Attorney's offer of immunity appears to have gone only 
to the "incident in the bar involving James Garner and as to 
nothing else." Respondent contends that the first statement 
made by the County Attorney after the prodding of Mr. 
Ungritch demonstrates the narrowness of the offered grant 
of immunity, if transactional. Mr. Call responded, "Well, 
to the extent that we're able to go beyond that [the scope of 
the offered immunity], we will." (Deposition, at p. 4). He 
forthrightly indicated that he was prepared to question 
Brackenbury as to incidents other than the events which 
occurred in the bar. His use of the phrase "go beyond that" 
indicates that his idea of what he offered as immunized 
testimony was not as broad as appellant argues. 
-65-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing points and authorities, 
respondent submits that appellants' convictions and 
sentences were proper and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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